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2The Bureaucratic Due Process of Government Watch Lists
Peter M. Shane*
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, watch lists have become increasingly 
important tools for law enforcement and the protection of homeland security.  Each list is a database 
that matches information about the identity of persons suspected of activities related to terrorism or 
other criminal activity with directions for government action appropriate to that individual.1   These 
lists, however, pose dangers.  Innocent persons may be burdened either because they are included on 
such lists without justification2 or because they share a name with another individual who is 
appropriately listed.3  At least two agencies have developed informal Aredress@ mechanisms to 
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1 See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 
AUDIT DIVISION, REVIEW OF THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER (Audit Report 05-27) (June 
2005), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/tsc.pdf (hereinafter, TSC REVIEW).
2 For example, one former U.S. diplomat, having discovered that he was on the ANo 
Fly@ watch list, has speculated that he may have been included because of professional contacts 
he had made in the course of international conflict mediation efforts.  John Graham, AWho=s 
Watching the Watch List?@ ALTERNET (July 7, 2005), available at 
http://www.alternet.org/katrina/23362. 
3 For example, in the words of Olivier Roy, Director of Research at France=s 
3attempt to remedy the latter problem.4  By themselves, however, these processes cannot insure initial 
watch list accuracy.5  Even a far more elaborate proposed redress model, outlined in a recent 
thoughtful paper by the Heritage Foundation,6 is unlikely to provide the best possible protection 
against watch list errors.  A redress system functions only at the Aback end@ of the process and only 
for those individuals who become aware that they are erroneously listed. 
Watch list errors are especially troubling because of the gravity of the interests affected. 
Both the United States as a nation and its citizens as individuals have the most profound possible 
stake in the inclusion on appropriate watch lists of those persons who pose genuine threats to our 
national security, including the risk of terrorism.  Watch lists can help insure that persons 
connected with terrorist activity are denied entry to the United States or dangerous access to 
National Center for Scientific Research: AYou have 100,000 people in Saudi Arabia alone who 
are named Al-Ramdi.@ A>Watch lists= cause chaos, IAFRICA.COM (May 16, 2005), available at 
http://travel.iafrica.com/flights/440441.htm.  This problem is exacerbated by the uncertainties of 
transliterating non-English names into English B for example, is a suspected person of interest 
named Yusuf, Youssuf, or Youssouf? B although well-publicized cases of mistaken Ahits@ have 
involved some notably non-exotic names, such as those of two members of Congress, Sen. 
Edward M. Kennedy, see Sarah Kehaulani Goo, ASen. Kennedy Flagged by No-Fly List,@
WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 20, 2004, at A1 (available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A17073-2004Aug19.html). and Rep. John R. Lewis, AKennedy has company on 
airline watch list,@ CNN.COM (Aug. 20, 2004), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/08/20/lewis.watch list/.
4 See text at notes 90-93.
5 According to the Transportation Security Administration, nearly 30,000 airline 
passengers asked the Department of Homeland Security Department to remove their names from 
watch lists, and all but about 60 were successful.  Audrey Hudson, 30-000 fliers seek watch-list 
removal, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2005, at A11.  
6 Paul Rosenzweig and Jeff Jonas, Correcting False Positives: Redress and the 
Watch List Conundrum (Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum No. 17, June 17, 2005).
4vulnerable networks and other physical facilities.  They can help focus legally permissible 
surveillance on fruitful targets.  They can assist in the coordination of multi-agency efforts to 
track potential threats and prevent them from ripening into attacks.
These interests are served, however, only to the extent that watch lists are accurate. The 
mistaken targeting of the innocent subtracts from the limited resources available to pursue 
genuinely productive law enforcement and national security initiatives.  To the extent watch lists 
impede travel or immigration by non-citizens who present no actual threat to the United States, 
they can exact substantial cultural, political, and economic costs, in both the short and long term. 
The interests of individual citizens in avoiding erroneous listing are similarly compelling.  For 
the person mistakenly targeted, costs may range from minor inconvenience to serious 
reputational damage or substantial limitations on privacy and freedom of action.  The burdens 
could range from some sort of surveillance of which the target remains unaware to a prohibition 
on entry into the United States or other travel.  Perhaps the most publicized uses of watch lists 
have involved passenger screening on commercial airlines.7  Passenger screening may result in 
intensified identity checks and personal inspection and, for persons on the ANo-Fly@ list, an 
effective ban on commercial air travel altogether.   
7
 In 2004, Congress removed this function from individual airlines and placed it in 
government hands. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, ' 4012.
5More than merely instrumental values are at stake, however, in the maintenance of watch 
list accuracy.   Secret programs of any kind strain against the norms of openness and transparency 
on which democratic legitimacy is based.  It may be rational for us, as citizens, to delegate 
authority to law enforcement agencies to operate partially in secret.  But the very fact of secrecy 
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the public to formulate fully deliberated, rational 
judgments as to whether these measures are appropriate to protect our national security.  Such 
systems thus always exist in tension with the identity we assert as fully empowered civic actors 
in a free political community.8  That identity would be undermined yet more forcefully should 
innocent citizens experience the undoubted nightmare of being labeled suspected terrorists or 
supporters of terrorism.  Should the unjustified targeting of innocent persons become widespread, 
the very fabric of mutual confidence between citizen and government that supports critical norms 
of cooperation and trust would be threatened.  It is thus crucial for government, in deploying 
secret watch lists as tools of law enforcement and national security, to address the inevitability of 
watch list error in a way that not only maximizes accuracy, but also pursues the accuracy goal in 
a way that maintains individual dignity and our collective ethos of mutual trust and democratic 
accountability.
8 Paul Gowder, Secrecy as Mystification of Power: Meaning and Ethics in the 
Security State, 2 ISJLP __ (2005).
6To American lawyers, the problems posed by watch lists are readily perceived as 
problems of Aprocedural due process.@  The national government has established a system of 
informal adjudication B namely, the identification of persons to include on terrorist watch lists B
which, if performed in error, threatens significant harm to individual persons.  The conventional 
Adue process@ response to this risk of adjudicative error is typically Asome kind of hearing,@9
either to prevent or redress the error through additional adjudicative formalities.  But the
adjudication of individual disputes, whether administratively or in judicial forums, cannot be the 
sole component of a program to pursue watch list fairness.  On one hand, the very aim of the 
watch list program is likely to preclude the possibility of pre-inclusion hearings for many of those 
persons proposed for watch list inclusion.  Presumably, for the government to afford a suspect 
notice that he or she might be the subject of covert surveillance would often be self-defeating.  
On the other hand, redress through post-inclusion mechanisms would work only retrospectively 
and only for those individuals who become aware of the fact of their inclusion.  Thousands of 
individuals might remain disadvantaged because of the watch lists through decision making 
procedures of which they are unaware.10  It ought to be viewed as intolerable in a democratic 
9 See generally Henry Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 
(1975).
10 There is no detailed public accounting of the number of names on antiterrorism 
watch lists.  A Washington Post story cites Acounterterrorism officials@ for the proposition that 
A[t]he National Counterterrorism Center maintains a central repository of 325,000 names of 
international terrorism suspects, or people who allegedly aid them.@  Given the interrelationship 
of the NCTC and the Terrorist Screening Center, discussed below, text at notes 29-33, this may 
be a decent estimate of the number of names on the complete set of government watch lists.  
According to the officials cites, AU.S. citizens make up >only a very, very small fraction= of that 
number.@  Walter Pincus and Dan Eggen, A325,000 Names on Terrorism List,@ WASH. POST, Feb. 
15, 2006, at A1.  The story does not say, however, what fraction comprises U.S. citizens and 
permanent resident aliens, all of whom are subject to the protections of the Fifth Amendment and 
7society for large numbers of innocent citizens to suffer stigmatic government action under a 
largely secret program, even if such cases can be Aredressed@ through individual review.
What is needed is a more robust form of what Professor Jerry Mashaw has labeled 
Abureaucratic justice,@ an institutional blending of Apositive administration, bureaucratically 
organized@11 with law-like constraints on the exercise of discretion designed to secure important 
public values. The difficulty of achieving this blend in any particular context stems in part from 
the complexity of the specific fact-finding task at hand.  But it is rooted also in the different 
emphases that arise more generically when we view the problem of bureaucratic justice 
simultaneously through two lenses B the lens of rationality that we associate with ordinary 
administration and a more moralistic lens we associate with those adjudicatory procedures 
normally followed in America for the protection of rights.  From an administrative perspective, 
justice appears as Aaccurate decisionmaking carried on through processes appropriately 
rationalized to account for costs.@12  From the perspective of traditional adjudication, the promise 
of justice is a Afull and equal opportunity@ to protect our entitlements.13  The argument proposed 
here for a fairness system for watch lists respects these competing impulses by tailoring the 
formality of post-inclusion fairness to the nature of the different claims presented and to the care 
with which Afront-end@ management protects the rights of individuals.
of the Privacy Act.  5 U.S.C. ' 552a(a)(2).
11 JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY CLAIMS 1 (1983).
12 Id. at 26.
13 Id. at 31.
8This paper proceeds as follows.  Part I provides a summary of the current government 
watch list system.  Part II elaborates further on the difference between the Abureaucratic justice@
and conventional due process approaches to achieving fair adjudicative systems.  It identifies the 
Afront-end@ management requirements that a sound bureaucratic justice design would entail in the 
watch list context.  It considers also the front-end provisions of the Privacy Act and explains why 
bureaucratic justice requires new legislation to impose what I call a Afairness charter@ on watch 
list management.  Part III then considers the redress problem in light of the recommended front-
end fairness measures.  What emerges is something less elaborate than the maximum due process 
model proposed by other reformers, but more protective than the minimum constitutional 
requirements imposed by the Fifth Amendment.  The article concludes by urging the synthesis of 
the front-end and redress proposals into a recommendation for framework legislation specific to 
national security watch list programs.  Implementing a bureaucratic justice approach will protect 
critical values of fairness and accountability, while avoiding an undue diversion of resources to 
individual redress hearings.
I. Watch Lists and Their Management 
An April, 2003 report of the Government Accountability Office identified twelve terrorist 
or criminal watch lists maintained by a total of nine separate federal agencies.14  These twelve 
lists or their successors apparently remain in existence, although, with the advent of the 
Department of Homeland Security, what were the nine managing agencies are now located 
within four, instead of five, cabinet departments, and the Departments of the Treasury and of 
14 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TERRORIST WATCH LISTS SHOULD BE 
CONSOLIDATED TO PROMOTED BETTER INTEGRATION AND SHARING (GAO-03-322) 13 (April 
9Transportation are no longer among them.15  To deal with the obvious problems posed by so 
fragmented an effort to collect and disseminate sensitive information, President Bush, on 
September 16, 2003, directed the Attorney general Ato establish an organization to consolidate 
the Government=s approach to terrorism screening.@16   In collaboration with the Director of 
Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, the Attorney 
General fulfilled his charge by creating, on December 1, 2003, a Terrorist Screening Center 
(TSC), the administration of which would be primarily the responsibility of the FBI.17  Among 
the TSC=s critical tasks is Ato create a unified, unclassified terrorist watch list.@18  The TSC effort, 
2003).
15 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FBI COULD BETTER MANAGE FIREARM-RELATED 
BACKGROUND CHECKS INVOLVING TERRORIST WATCH LIST RECORDS (GAO-05-127) 9 (January 
2005) (hereafter, 2005 GAO REPORT).
16 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6: Integration and Use of Screening 
Information, ' 1 (Sept. 16, 2003).
17 TSC REVIEW, supra note 1, at iii.
18 Id., at iv.  The President=s September, 2003 order was also intended to promote 
increased cooperation among federal agencies in sharing information.  Earlier in the year, the 
Department of Homeland Security, the FBI=s Counterterrorism Division, the Department of 
Defense, and the DCI=s Counterterrorist Center had collaborated to create a Terrorist Threat 
Integration Center (TTIC).  The White House, Fact Sheet: Strengthening Intelligence to Better 
Protect America (January 28, 2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov//news/releases/2003/01/20030128-12.html. The TTIC was designed 
Ato develop comprehensive threat assessments through the integration of terrorist information 
collected domestically and abroad by the U.S. government.@  TSC REVIEW, supra note 1, at iv n. 
6.  President Bush=s September, 2003 order charged the heads of executive departments and 
agencies, to the extent permitted by law, to provide the TTIC with all Aterrorist information@ in 
their possession, custody and control.  (ATerrorist information@ is Athorough, accurate, and current 
information about individuals known or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in 
conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism.@  Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 6: Integration and Use of Screening Information (Sept. 16, 2003).) He 
vested in the TTIC the reciprocal obligation to provide access for reporting agencies to all such 
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however, is Anot to replace existing watch lists@; instead, agencies are Aexpected to continue 
gathering and developing terrorist information and to maintain separate systems to fulfill their 
distinctive missions.@19
As shown in Table 1 on the next page, the government=s watch lists are used for a variety 
of purposes.  The Department of State, for example, uses its AConsular Lookout and Support@ and 
ATIPOFF@ watch lists to screen visa applications to U.S. embassies and consulates.  Lists 
maintained by the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security are used to control entry into 
the United States at our borders or to manage the stays of non-citizens in the United States.  The 
Transportation Security Agency uses its ASelectee@ and ANo-Fly@ lists either to intensify the 
screening of designated persons who attempt to board commercial aircraft or to bar their 
boarding altogether.   The terrorist watch lists are also consulted as part of the National Instant 
Criminal Background Check System (NICS) in connection with prospective firearms 
purchases.20 The advent of the integrated TSC did not reduce the operational significance of 
the individual agency lists.  In its opening months, the TSC responded to field inquiries 
exclusively by consulting the watch lists maintained by individual agencies..21   The TSC has 
now developed what is called the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB).22  Even though all TSC 
information within TTIC control.  Id., ' 2.  The TTIC functions were transferred on August 27, 
2004 to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).  Exec. Order No. 13,354, 69 Fed. Reg. 
53,589 (2004).
19 Id.
20 2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 1.
21 TSC REVIEW, supra note 1, at iv.
22 Id. at 20-25.
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Dept. Agency List Purposes Further Background
Bureau of 
Consular Affairs
Consular Lookout 
& Support System
Vetting foreign nationals 
seeking visas
Receives information from 
TIPOFF
State
Bureau of 
Intelligence and 
Research
TIPOFF Tracking known and 
suspected international
terrorists
Created in 1987, transferred to 
NCTC in 2003, which plans to 
create new Terrorist Identities 
Datamart Identities watch list
U.S. Customs 
and Border 
Protection
Interagency 
Border Inspection 
System
Primary database for 
border management and 
Customs law 
enforcement functions
Part of Treasury Enforcement 
Communications System 
(TECS)
No-Fly List Identify threats to civil 
aviation
Transportation 
Security Agency
Selectee List Selecting passengers for 
additional screening
National 
Automated 
Immigration 
Lookout System
Biographical and case 
date for aliens who may 
be inadmissible to US
Created originally by INS, 
now absorbed into DHS 
systems in 2005; also housed 
in the TECS
Home-
land 
Security
U.S. 
Immigration and 
Customs 
Enforcement
Automated Bio-
metric Identification 
System
Tracking  aliens entering 
US illegally or suspected 
of crimes
Created by INS, transferred to 
DHS
U.S Marshals 
Service
Warrant 
Information 
Network
Tracking persons with 
existing federal warrants
Does not perform any 
independent watch list 
function regarding terrorism
Violent Gang and 
Terrorist 
Organization File
Tracking individuals 
associated with gangs, 
terrorist organizations
Created in 1995 as a 
component of the National 
Crime Information Center
FBI
Integrated Automa-
ted Fingerprint ID 
System
National fingerprint and 
criminal history database
Justice
U.S. National 
Central Bureau 
of Interpol
Interpol Terrorism 
Watch List
Assistance for global 
police operations
Created in 2002; contains 
about 100 names also in other 
watch lists
Defense Air Force Office 
of Special 
Investigations
Top 10 Fugitive List Retrieving Air Force 
fugitives
Performs no independent 
terrorist watch list function
TABLE 1.  WATCH LISTS MAINTAINED BY FEDERAL AGENCIES24
24 Information presented in this table is compiled from TSC REVIEW, supra note 1, 
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research in response to law enforcement inquiries begins with the TSDB, agency databases are 
searched as  well.23
Information moves in both directions between agency watch lists and the TSDB.  That is, 
the TSDB was originally created by importing information from what the TSC considered the six 
primary agency watch lists, shown in boldface on Table 1.25  The TSDB=s current version, 
however, can Acommunicate with the participating agencies= IT infrastructures,@26 and is used for 
exporting records into the watch lists of individual agencies.  Thus, even if the TSDB is now the 
originating watch list for a newly included record, that information is expected to be 
disseminated to other relevant agencies. As a result, a name on any watch list should now exist 
on multiple watch lists, that is, both the TSDB and the watch lists of agencies whose 
responsibilities relate to the potential threat posed by the individual whose record has been 
created. 
It is self-evident that the creation, maintenance, dissemination, and use of watch list 
records all pose significant technical and policy questions.  It is noteworthy, therefore, that there 
is no framework legislation providing the relevant agencies with congressionally approved 
criteria to shape the watch list effort.  This is not to say that agencies are operating watch lists 
at 5-9, and 2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 9.  The watch lists in boldface are deemed 
primary watch lists by the TSC.
23 Id. at 37.
25 Technically, the TSC conceptualized this effort as comprising only five watch 
lists, because a single database, the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS), 
housed both the Interagency Border Inspection System and the National Automated Immigration 
Lookout System.  TSC REVIEW, supra note 1, at v.
26 Id. at 23.
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without legislative authority.  In the case of airline screening, DHS is operating under explicit 
congressional directives.27  Statutory references to watch lists indicate that Congress is aware of 
and has ratified other watch list initiatives.28  In yet other cases, because the use of watch lists is 
so customary a law enforcement technique, the agencies would be on solid ground resting their 
watch list initiatives on their general regulatory authority.  However, the fact remains that no 
relevant legislation articulates the operational standards by which agencies are to be guided in 
including, removing, or sharing particular records.
According to a June, 2005 Report of the Justice Department=s Office of Inspector 
General, names now enter the master TSDB through a so-called Anomination@ process.29  Under 
the Aroutine@ nomination process, names of persons suspected of being related to domestic or 
international terrorist activity are submitted to either the FBI or to the National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC).30   Staff members within these organizations then decide whether the person is 
27 Responsibility for airport screening was originally vested in the Undersecretary of 
Transportation for Security.  44 U.S.C. ' 44901.  Those functions have since been transferred to 
the Department of Homeland Security. 6 U.S.C. ' 203.  Congress has likewise provided 
explicitly for the mandatory screening of airline employees Aagainst all appropriate records in the 
consolidated and integrated terrorist watch list maintained by the Federal Government@ before 
being certificated by the FAA or granted unescorted access to secure areas of an airport or to an 
airport=s Aair operations@ area.  44 U.S.C. ' 44903(j)(2(D).
28 See, e.g., references to the Consular Lookout and Support System in 8 U.S.C. '
1202(h)(2)(C), or to the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System in Pub. L. 107-
56, Title IV, ' 405(a), 115 Stat. 345 (2001).
29 TSC REVIEW, supra note 1, at 41-43.
30 The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was created by executive order in 
August, 2004.  It took over the functions and activities originally vested in a Terrorist Threat 
Integration Center (TTIC), Aestablished on May 1, 2003, to develop comprehensive threat 
assessments through the integration and analysis of terrorist information collected domestically 
and abroad by the U.S. government.@  Id. at iv n. 6.
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Aan appropriate candidate for inclusion@ on the consolidated watch list and Awhether or not 
sufficient identifying information is available.@31  An Aemergency@ nomination process also exists 
for imminent terror threats; in such circumstances, the requesting agency may bring its 
information directly to the TSC, which creates a record in the master list and all supporting 
databases.  If the threat relates to international terrorism, the TSC compiles all available 
information on the subject and forwards it to the NCTC with the specific aim of creating a record 
in the State Department=s TIPOFF system.32
Although these processes can, in theory, provide a sound vetting of potential records 
before they are included in any of the terror watch lists, the reality B as of June, 2005 B was not as 
reassuring:
At the time of our review, the TSC process for including a name in the 
TSDB was more of an acceptance than nomination. TSC staff did not review the 
majority of the records submitted unless an automated error occurred while the 
records were uploaded to the database. While we recognize that the ultimate 
decision for nomination into the consolidated database should be done by analysts 
who have access to originating documentation, the TSC needs to ensure that the 
information that is placed into the TSDB accurately represents the data that was 
(sic) submitted by the nominating agency. In addition, the TSC should establish 
controls to ensure that it can trace the origin of the record to the agency that 
nominated it. When comparing TSDB records to the source information, we 
identified differences for which the TSC could not provide an adequate 
explanation.33
In other words, the TSC was not imposing any serious independent quality control in vetting 
potential records before their inclusion in the TSDB.  Although there is no reason to doubt the 
31 Id. at 41-42.
32 Id. at 42.
33 Id.
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seriousness or good faith with which originating agencies are forwarding names for watch list 
inclusion, the seeming absence of common standards and the possibility of lax control at the TSC 
raise serious concerns with regard to possibilities for error.
The TSC does remove or Ascrub@ names from the consolidated watch list.  Nearly 3,700 
names were deleted between June and October, 2004 alone.34  A removal can apparently be 
triggered by the TSC or by the originating agency, whose supporting database signals to the TSC 
that a record should be removed from the consolidated list.  As recounted in the report of the 
Justice Department Inspector General:  ASimilar to its role in the nomination process, the TSC 
does not analyze these deletion requests and relies on the supporting agencies to conduct the 
necessary analysis that would lead to record deletion.@35
The Inspector General=s audit report describes a TSC misidentification correction process 
which, like the nomination process, is simultaneously reassuring and troubling:
When a person has been encountered and call screeners find that the individual 
has mistakenly been identified as a hit against the consolidated watch list, the 
incident (or misidentification) is documented, reviewed by management, and 
provided to the TSC=s Quality Assurance team for further action. The Quality 
Assurance team is to review the information and coordinate with the agency that 
nominated the record for inclusion in the database to determine what actions are 
needed to resolve the misidentification, including the possibility of removing a 
name from the TSDB. 
According to TSC officials, the organization has recently established a process to 
accept referrals from other agencies of complaints or inquiries from individuals 
who are having difficulty in a screening process that may be related to the 
consolidated terrorist watch list. According to this process, the TSC Quality 
Assurance staff researches each individual case to determine if the individual is a 
misidentified person B that is, an individual who is mistaken for a watch listed 
34 Id. at 43.
35 Id.
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person but is not actually a known or suspected terrorist. TSC managers reported 
that they are working with each screening agency to develop procedures for the 
various screening processes to help misidentified persons. 
However, we found that these processes had not been articulated in a formal, 
written document clearly defining the protocols to be followed by TSC staff when 
addressing misidentification issues. Because of the serious impact of possible 
misidentifications, we believe the TSC should formally articulate procedures for 
handling misidentifications and train its staff on the proper way to manage these 
occurrences.36
In other words, although there is no reason to doubt the TSC=s seriousness and good faith with 
regard to scrubbing names from the TSDB that were included without justification, it is far from 
clear that the process works with anything close to complete accuracy.
This, then, is the context within which a watch list fairness system must operate.  At first, 
looking at Table 1, it might seem misguided to contemplate an integrated fairness system that 
pertains to each of these lists.  The considerations surrounding, say, the No-Fly List and the 
Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File may be substantially different.  Yet, the existence 
of the TSC at the hub of all these watch lists, and the fact that any agency=s management process 
is thus likely to reverberate throughout all relevant agencies, strongly suggest that some sort of 
integrated framework is necessary.
II. A Front-End Fairness System for Government Watch Lists
A. Why Bureaucratic Justice Focuses on Front-End Decision Making
36 Id. at 74-75.
In thinking through the features of a system designed to protect fairness values in the use 
of government watch lists, the idea of Abureaucratic justice,@ distinct from conventional due 
process doctrine, may at first seem unnecessarily grandiose.  Professor Mashaw=s call for a 
17
blending of positive administration with internalized constraints on discretion designed to 
achieve individual fairness sounds suspiciously like straightforward Agood management.@  This 
might seem especially so in the watch list context.  The government does not have, any more 
than would any individual citizen, a rational interest in burdening people through antiterrorist 
watch lists if they are not themselves reasonably suspected of possible terrorist connections.  
AAccuracy@ would seem the obvious beacon at which both government and individual citizens 
should want agencies to aim.  So, why is it useful to think of achieving accuracy as anything 
other than a managerial problem?
The answer is cost.  Due process doctrine is not wholly cost-oblivious.  It does not require 
government agencies to employ decision making procedures unrelated to improving the accuracy 
of decision making.  But the conventional due process approach is largely cost insensitive.37  Its 
aim is to secure fairness to individuals.  The cost of hearings alone typically will not trump an 
individual=s interest in fairness if it can be shown that additional procedures will improve 
decision making accuracy and not undermine the government function at issue.38  On the other 
hand, conventional agency management may be relatively insensitive to burdens imposed on 
individuals by erroneous overreaching.  Agency decision makers can be expected to regard 
constraints on their discretion as costly compromises with their primary objective of fulfilling 
their agency=s substantive mission.  To the extent actual time and money need be spent to insure 
that innocent persons are not mistakenly ensnared by government watch lists, this is time and 
37 The high-water mark of this relative insensitivity is Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 
254 (1970) (requiring oral hearings prior to the termination of public assistance benefits).
38 Cf., Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1977) (requiring 
pretermination adjudicative hearing for public employees dischargeable only for cause).
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money that could also be spent trying to target and pursue more suspected terrorists.  A law 
enforcement agency generally gets more positive political feedback for effectiveness in stopping 
crime than for assiduousness in clearing the innocent.  Thus, even a well managed agency might 
find itself more tolerant of watch list error on cost-benefit grounds than a robust concern for 
justice would suggest.
A bureaucratic justice approach to due process seeks to reconcile these competing 
perspectives on cost.  It does so by targeting what might be called Afairness resources@ on the 
overall management of a decision making program, especially on the front-end when initial 
decisions have to be made.  This move, executed well, can potentially avoid and remedy 
significantly more cases of potential error than a post hoc redress system itself can accomplish.  It 
serves the goals fairness to individuals and democratic accountability that are at the heart of due 
process. Conversely, because these are resources devoted to the efficacy of agency performance 
on the agency=s own terms, and not just to individual complaints after the fact, their allocation 
does not derogate from the agency=s main mission, but underscores its significance.  A watch list 
system that pursues accuracy more vigilantly at the front end will, in fact, serve the government=s 
interests better than one that does not.  Conceptualizing this as Abureaucratic justice,@ not simply 
as Agood management,@ underscores why this is worth doing, even if it an agency focused solely 
on efficiency would worry less about its error rate or negative impact on innocent citizens.
B. Elements of a Front-End AFairness Charter
Seen through a bureaucratic justice lens, it is all but self-evident that an effective fairness 
system cannot rely exclusively, or perhaps even primarily, on post-listing redress.  No matter 
how elaborate the redress system, it will protect only those individuals who become aware that 
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they are listed because of the explicit imposition of a list-triggered burden. It is easy to imagine 
not only that many listed persons will not discover that fact, but also that the interests of national 
security investigations might best be served by at least some targets= ignorance as to their precise 
watch list status.  Equally as important, post-listing redress is likely to be difficult for individuals 
whose complaint is that they have been listed without adequate justification.  Permitting such 
individuals to contest their inclusion effectively might require the disclosure of information that 
would undermine the integrity of the watch list program.  This is not to say that special protective 
measures cannot be designed, but the cumbersome nature of the process itself is an argument in 
favor of front-end practices that can operate with greater confidentiality.
Without belaboring the comparison, there are lessons to be learned here from work that 
has been done on other systems of mass adjudication.  In fact, if we think of the decision to list 
individuals as a species of adjudication, albeit informal, then the way in which policy makers can 
best organize their task is well captured by Professor Mashaw=s description of bureaucratic 
rationality in processing social security disability claims.  For watch lists, as for social security, 
Athe administrative goal in the ideal conception of bureaucratic rationality is to develop, at the 
least possible cost, a system for distinguishing between true and false claims.@39  An agency 
assigned some such goal execute its mission with primary reference to facts, and not values.  In 
Professor Mashaw=s words, AA system focused on correctness defines the questions presented to 
it by implementing decisions in essentially factual and technocratic terms.@40  Such a model 
Awould exclude questions of value or preference as obviously irrelevant to the administrative 
39 MASHAW, supra note 11, at 25.
40 Id.
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task, and it would view reliance on nonreplicable, nonreviewable judgment or intuition as a 
singularly unattractive methodology for decision.@41  The stress on replicable, reliable judgment 
is crucial, because judgments based on anything less would defeat the possibility of efficient 
supervisory determinations whether adjudicative actions truly corresponded to the Astate of the 
world.@42  In a large-scale government setting, an agency=s central focus on Ainformation retrieval 
and processing,@ its central Adecisional technique,@ implies the necessity for a formal decisional 
structure:
[The] application of knowledge must in any large-scale program be 
structured through the usual bureaucratic routines: selection and training of 
personnel, detailed specification of administrative tasks, specialization and 
division of labor, coordination via rules and hierarchical lines of authority, and 
hierarchical review of the accuracy and efficiency of decisionmaking. . . .From the 
perspective of bureaucratic rationality, administrative justice is accurate 
decisionmaking carried on through processes appropriately rationalized to take 
account of costs.43
Thus, in developing sound proposals for systems of decision making in which fairness equates 
with accuracy, we must attend to the Amethodology for collecting and combining those facts . . . 
that will reveal the proper decision@ and how the program is structured through Abureaucratic 
routines.@44
From this perspective, four kinds of protection seem essential to the integrity of watch 
lists: the development and communication of standards, the design of decision making processes 
41 Id. at 26.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
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to produce reliable decision making, internal monitoring and control to assure quality control, 
and the implementation of an information technology architecture well designed to facilitate 
consistency and completeness in the maintenance of records.
1. Developing and Communicating Standards
No proposition is more fundamental to bureaucratic justice in the use of watch lists than 
the idea that records should be assembled based on some ascertainable standard for the collection 
of information.  There need to be standards governing the inclusion of targets and, consistent 
with democratic theory, these standards must relate directly to the legislatively assigned mission 
of each agency maintaining a watch list.  Most important, within a bureaucratic environment, 
those standards should exist in writing, so that they can be communicated in identical terms to 
everyone involved in maintaining and deploying the watch list.
The June, 2005 report of the Justice Department OIG, with regard to the Terrorist 
Screening Center, found that the NCTC and TSC were reviewing names Anominated@ for 
inclusion on watch lists.  There was no mention, however, of any standards, published even 
within the agencies, that stated precise criteria for the inclusion of names.  If objective standards 
are unavailable, then the efficacy of reviewing nominations must inevitably be limited.  How 
might any potential listing be discarded for inadequate justification if there is no prior agreement 
as to what justification would consist of?
Because watch lists are intended to minimize risks in an uncertain environment, agencies 
will not want to be excessively rule-bound in deciding whom to include.  The necessity for 
flexibility, however, does not preclude standards.  Any list of substantive criteria can be 
described as non-exhaustive, provided that the inclusion of an individual based on categories of 
22
evidence other than those enumerated be based on evidence of comparable probativeness with 
regard to the overall finding of risk.  Moreover, the standard for inclusion may include a level of 
proof or necessary confidence that offers the agency substantial decision making leeway.  
Depending on the consequences attached to being listed, Aarticulable suspicion@ that an 
individual meets the specified substantive standard might be all that is required.  The basic point 
remains, however, that a system for Adistinguishing true and false@ ought to have as its basis 
some shared understanding of the grounds for deciding who ought and who ought not to be 
included.
2. Nomination Processes
Not only do public documents fail to discuss whether persons are being included for 
watch lists under clear standards, but there does not appear to be any standard decision making 
process for inclusion.  The Justice Department OIG described the nomination process as follows:
When a law enforcement or intelligence agency has identified an individual as a 
potential terrorist threat to the United States and wants the individual to be added 
to the consolidated watch list, that person must be Anominated@ for inclusion in the 
TSDB. Nominations occur in two ways Bindividuals may be added through the 
Routine Nomination Process, or they may be deemed an immediate threat that 
requires use of the Emergency/Expedited Nomination Process. The Routine 
Nomination Process, the most common of the two nomination methods, involves 
the submission of international or domestic terrorist-related names by government 
agents to either NCTC or the Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit (TWWU) at the 
FBI. Staff members review the information and decide whether or not the person 
is an appropriate candidate for inclusion on the TSC=s watch list and whether or 
not sufficient identifying information is available. If so, the information is 
forwarded to the TSC for inclusion in the consolidated database.45
45 TSC REVIEW, supra note 2, at 41-42.
This description, however, leaves many key procedural details unaddressed.  How are 
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submissions by Agovernment agents@ developed?  May agents in the field nominate names 
directly, or must they clear nominations through screening processes within the individual 
nominating agencies?  What determines whether the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 
or the FBI is the reviewing agency?  Are their standards for inclusion or exclusion identical?  
How do NCTC or FBI staff members conduct their review?  Are names included or excluded 
based on the determination of a single examiner, or are there multiple levels of review?  Are the 
nominating agencies made aware of the disposition of their nominations?  Is there a post-listing 
process to determine whether names listed through the Emergency Nomination Process actually 
meet the standards applicable to the watch lists?
Questions such as these would seem important in direct proportion to the degree to which 
watch list inclusion depends on debatable judgments.  In some cases, to be sure, watch list 
designation will result from easily verifiable information, e.g., a targeted individual is a known 
member of a violent or terrorist gang.  In many other cases, inclusion will presumably be more 
speculative.  It may be that an agency has information which, if true, would plainly warrant an 
individual=s inclusion, but a judgment call remains as to the quality of the information.  Or, the 
TSC may have unquestionably solid information, but be uncertain whether the information 
actually correlates with risk.  In such cases, it seems especially important that watch list decision 
making be made as reliable as possible.  The process should be designed so that decisions to 
include or exclude names be relatively uniform no matter who originates the nomination.  
Reliability is critical not only to the accuracy of the system, but also as a guarantee of equality in 
the treatment of all citizens.  The nominating process should be structured to promote reliability 
across agents and across agencies in order to help assure the public that decisions are being made 
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as objectively as possible.
3. Internal Monitoring and Hierarchical Control
 The June, 2005 OIG report on the TSC found Ainstances where the consolidated database 
did not contain names that should have been included on the watch list,@ as well as some 
Ainaccurate information related to persons included in the database.@46  The report=s conclusions 
suggest that clearer standards and better decision making procedures, as well as greater care in 
record handling, would all be helpful in addressing this issue.47  But, even with clearer standards 
and better procedures, errors would be inevitable.  Especially because those errors may affect 
individuals who do not know they are listed, it is imperative that the government have internal 
monitoring and accountability processes in place that do not rely on external complaints to 
prompt the correction of errors.
The OIG Report makes the point as straightforwardly as it can be made:
The TSC must establish a mechanism for regularly testing the information 
contained within the consolidated databases. A database containing such vast 
amounts of information from multiple government agencies cannot be maintained 
successfully without standard procedures to ensure that the information being 
received, viewed, and shared is of the utmost reliability. 
For purposes of internal quality control, there needs to be some regular sampling of records, 
presumably on a random basis,48 to determine whether information is accurately recorded, 
whether the information is properly linked to the appropriate mode of government response (e.g., 
46 Id. at xi.
47 Id. at 66.
48 In a well-managed system, there would also be oversampling of any subgroups of 
records that had shown themselves over time to be disproportionately likely to be the site of 
errors.
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visa denial, intensified airport inspection, etc.), whether information about individuals is 
consistent where it appears in multiple databases, and that inclusion of each record is consistent 
with the governing standards and required decision procedures.
Given the number of systems involved, there should also be formal channels of 
coordination and accountability to insure that errors are corrected and that responsible agencies 
learn from internal monitoring processes.  For example, each agency maintaining a watch list that 
feeds or is fed by the TSDB should have a person designated to serve as Records Integrity 
Officer.  (This task may be of sufficient priority and complexity that it ought not simply be added 
to the assignments of the agency=s CIO.)  A council of such officers could be coordinated out of 
the TSC, with direct reporting to the Attorney General.
4. Fairness and Information Technology Architecture
Given the close interconnection between fairness and accuracy, a critical aspect of any 
fairness system must be the design of a system architecture that supports the sharing of 
information in reliable, accurate form.  In 2003, however, the General Accounting Office 
determined that watch list activities were not yet supported by a common architecture:
In order for systems to work more effectively and efficiently, each system=s key 
components have to meet certain criteria. In particular, their operating systems 
and applications have to conform to certain standards that are in the public 
domain, their databases have to be built according to explicitly defined and 
documented data schemas and data models, and their networks have to be 
connected. . . . Also, these systems= data would have to have commonC or at least 
mutually understoodCdata definitions so that data could, at a minimum, be 
received and processed, and potentially aggregated and analyzed. Such data 
definitions are usually captured in a data dictionary. Further, these systems would 
have to be connected to each other via a telecommunications network or 
networks. When system components and data do not meet such standards, 
additional measures have to be employed, such as acquiring or building and 
maintaining unique system interfaces (hardware and software) or using manual 
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workarounds. These measures introduce additional costs and reduce efficiency 
and effectiveness. The 12 automated watch list systems do not meet all of these 
criteria.49
Attacking this problem was a primary goal behind establishing the consolidated Terrorist 
Screening Data Base in the Department of Justice, and the OIG Report substantiates significant 
TSC activity aimed at meeting it.  It ought to be mandatory, however, that the system be so 
designed that error corrections are easily and reliably propagated through all relevant databases.
Closely related to this concern is the imperative to maintain watch list databases under 
fully secure conditions.  ASecure Flight,@ a proposed next-generation program for airport 
passenger checks, has been repeatedly delayed because of unresolved security concerns.50  Even 
if records are fully accurate once posted, the vulnerability of government information systems to 
hacking could significantly compromise the reliability of watch lists.  Data security is thus 
essential both to the utility of the watch list program and fairness to individuals.
5.  Towards a Fairness Charter
49 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (REPORT NO. GAO-03-322), INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY: TERRORIST WATCH LISTS SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED TO PROMOTE BETTER 
INTEGRATION AND SHARING, at 23-24 (April, 2003).
50 Secure Flight is a proposed successor to the so-called CAPPS-I. (Computer 
Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening) program, which has been in place since 1977.  A proposed 
CAPPS-II, which would have attributed risk scores to passengers based on information in 
government and commercial databases, was scuttled in 2004 over privacy and security concerns. 
 On the delays in Secure Flight resulting in part from security concerns, see Leslie Miller, 
APassenger Security Check Program Scrapped,@ WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2006, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/09/AR2006020900865.html; 
Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government 
Accountability Office, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation on ASignificant Management Challenges May Adversely Affect Implementation 
of the Transportation Security Administration=s Secure Flight Program@ (Feb. 9, 2006), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06374t.pdf.
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Because of the interrelationship of fairness and accuracy in the compilation of watch lists, 
a sound bureaucratic justice approach to watch list management would mandate the four 
principles just elaborated:
1. Agencies maintaining watch lists should so do under clear written standards that specify 
the general criteria for inclusion, the kinds of information regarded as relevant evidence 
that the criteria have been met, and the standards of proof appropriate for including 
individuals when information is received.
2. Agencies maintaining watch lists should follow a rigorous nominating process, structured 
to promote reliability across agents and across agencies in order to help assure the public 
that decisions are being made as objectively as possible.
3.  Agencies maintaining watch lists should pursue rigorous programs of internal monitoring 
to insure the completeness, timeliness, and accuracy of all records, including the 
completeness, timeliness, and accuracy of error correction.  Each agency should appoint a 
Records Integrity Officer to oversee the implementation of these processes.
4.     Agencies maintaining watch lists should employ a system architecture to assure that 
accuracy and completeness of records are maintained in the sharing of records, with the 
particular goal of insuring that error correction in any database results in error correction 
in every other database containing the same foundational record.
These steps would not eliminate the need for a redress system, but, as discussed below, the 
legislative imposition of these requirements, accompanied by the publication of agency standards 
and vigorous oversight to insure compliance, would significantly affect the context in which 
redress systems would be designed and implemented.
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C.  The Inadequacy of the Privacy Act
Before embracing these proposals, a knowledgeable observer might well ask, ADoesn=t the 
federal Privacy Act of 1974 already do this job?@  Watch lists are presumptively covered by the 
Privacy Act, which prescribes an elaborate management structure for any federal Asystem of 
records,@ that is, Aa group of any records under the control of any agency from which information 
is retrieved by the name of the individual@ or by some other Aidentifying particular,@ such as a 
fingerprint.51  Individuals protected by the Act include both U.S. citizens and permanent resident 
aliens (PRA=s).52  Watch lists clearly fall within the Act=s general purview.
To help insure the integrity and fair use of records concerning such persons, the Act 
implements a set of fair information practices developed by an Advisory Committee on 
Automated Personal Data, established in 1972 by Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare 
Elliot Richardson and chaired by Willis H. Ware.53  The Act=s provisions include standards for 
the compilation, management, and handling of records, detailed conditions for the disclosure of 
such records once collected, requirements for the accounting of those disclosures, access for 
51 5 U.S.C. ' 552a(a)(5).
52 5 U.S.C. ' 552a(a)(2).
53 UNITED STATES DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE SECRETARY'S 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND 
THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973).
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individuals to the records that pertain to them, a process for individuals to seek the correction or 
amendment of such records, and civil and criminal penalties for noncompliance.  There are also 
extensive requirements for agency publicity concerning the existence of such records and the 
terms under which they are employed.
One of these requirements in particular might be thought to embrace the kind of measures 
contemplated by the proposed fairness charter.  That is, all agencies that maintain systems of 
records are required, except when disclosing records under the command of the Freedom of 
Information Act,54 to make Areasonable efforts,@ prior to dissemination, Ato assure@ that any 
records disclosed Aare accurate, complete, timely, and relevant for agency purposes.@55 An agency 
implementing the fairness charter measures recommended above could well argue, on that basis, 
that it has fulfilled this critical mandate.  What is less clear, however, is the converse proposition. 
 That is, the Privacy Act=s requirement of Areasonable efforts@ might be too general to impose in 
and of itself the detailed panoply of protective fairness charter measures.  Even if the fairness 
charter recommendations are consistent with the Privacy Act, new legislation expressly imposing 
fairness charter requirements on watch list programs would take a significant step forward 
beyond the Privacy Act=s general guidance and enumerate requirements specifically tailored to 
watch list objectives and the issues watch lists pose.
Also consistent with a bureaucratic justice approach, the Act specifies six other rules also 
with regard to sound front-end practice.  The key requirements are that the agency:
54 5 U.S.C. ' 552a(b)(2), referring to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. '
552.
55 5 U.S.C. '552a(e)(6).
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1. A[M]aintain in its records only such information about an individual as is relevant 
and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished 
by statute or by Executive order of the President;@56
2. A[C]ollect information to the greatest extent practicable directly from the subject 
individual when the information may result in adverse determinations about an 
individual's rights, benefits, and privileges under Federal programs;@57
3. A[M]aintain all records which are used by the agency in making any determination 
about any individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness 
as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to the individual in the 
determination;@58
4. A[M]aintain no record describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed 
by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the 
individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within 
the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity;@59
5. A[E]stablish rules of conduct for persons involved in the design, development, 
operation, or maintenance of any system of records, or in maintaining any record, 
and instruct each such person with respect to such rules and the requirements of 
this section, including any other rules and procedures adopted pursuant to this 
section and the penalties for noncompliance;@60 and
6. A[E]stablish appropriate administrative, technical and physical safeguards to 
insure the security and confidentiality of records and to protect against any 
anticipated threats or hazards to their security or integrity which could result in 
substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any individual 
on whom information is maintained.@61
These provisions, however, are also no substitute for the specific fairness charter 
56 5 U.S.C. '552a(e)(1).
57 5 U.S.C. '552a(e)(2).
58 5 U.S.C. '552a(e)(5).
59 5 U.S.C. '552a(e)(7).
60 5 U.S.C. '552a(e)(9).
61 5 U.S.C. '552a(e)(10).
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requirements. Considering them in reverse order, the last of these requirements B providing for 
the establishment of security and confidentiality requirements B is critical to protecting systems 
of records from corruption by persons achieving unauthorized access. As indicated above, 
however, the requirement for systems security is only part of a larger concern that agencies 
maintain an information technology architecture supportive of accurate records maintenance and 
ease of correction across databases.62
The fifth requirement, mandating promulgation of, and training in, appropriate rules of 
conduct with regard to systems of records is simply too general a prescription to provide the level 
of assurance regarding fair and accurate record keeping that is appropriate to watch list programs. 
The Privacy Act is silent with regard to the kinds of conduct that ought to be subject to rules.  
The fourth requirement, limiting the collection of records regarding individuals= exercise of their 
First Amendment rights, does not address accuracy issues at all.
The third requirement, namely, that Agencies Amaintain all records which are used . . . in 
making any determination about any individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and 
completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to the individual,@ does come closer to 
implying what the fairness charter would demand.  But, aside from the level of generality with 
which the Privacy Act articulates this requirement, there is another problem in applying it to 
watch lists.  Specifically, the Privacy Act allows agencies to promulgate rules exempting 
themselves from this requirement if they are law enforcement agencies and the records are 
compiled for the purpose of criminal investigation.63  The Justice Department has issued a final 
62 See text at note 50.
63 5 U.S.C. '552a(k)(2).
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rule exempting the Terrorist Screening Records System from this requirement.64  Although it is 
questionable whether every existing antiterrorist watch list may properly be exempted from the 
requirements of 5 U.S.C. ' 552a(e)(5), as long as the applicability to watch lists of this key 
Privacy Act principle is in doubt, the case is strengthened for enacting a legislative framework 
specific to the administration of watch lists.
64 70 Fed. Reg. 72199-01 (Dec. 2, 2005) (FBI final rule exempting TSC records 
from various Privacy Act provisions).
Agencies that may exempt themselves from the conditions for records maintenance are 
also permitted to seek exemption from the first two requirements, namely, that record keeping be 
limited to what is relevant to the fulfillment of agency objectives assigned by statute or executive 
order and that, to the extent possible, information potentially detrimental to individuals should be 
collected directly from subject individuals themselves.  The fairness charter=s requirements on 
written policy would obviate the first relevancy limitation on the collection of records.  As for the 
requirement that information that might Aresult in adverse determinations about an individual's 
rights, benefits, and privileges under Federal programs@ be collected from that individual Ato the 
greatest extent practicable,@ this would likely not be a meaningful constraint on government 
watch lists even if it applied.  The extent to which it is practicable to collect information on 
potential terror suspects from the suspects themselves is narrowly limited by the law enforcement 
and national security objectives of the program.  In sum, although the Privacy Act=s articulation 
of front end principles represents sound policy, its provisions do not provide an adequate 
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substitute for a legislatively prescribed fairness charter specifically tailored to the objectives of 
government watch list programs.
III. Reconsidering Redress
No fairness system for any kind of significant government adjudication will be complete 
without some mechanism for redressing errors in individual cases.  The American public is 
unlikely to accept as legitimate a watch list system that fails to offer redress for persons 
improperly included.  Apart from its instrumental utility, a redress system must be sufficiently 
robust to express and vindicate citizens= interest in being treated respectfully and accountably by 
their government.  But, of course, a redress system also has a narrower managerial purpose.  It 
represents a mechanism for achieving greater accuracy in a government program.  In designing 
the instrumental features of a redress system in this sense, it is obviously appropriate to account 
for the rigor and comprehensiveness of front-end fairness protections in deciding on key aspects 
of what redress requires.  To put the point most bluntly, the greater the government=s front-end 
investment in fairness, the less compelling will be the case for highly formal adjudicative 
mechanisms to redress the possibility of individual errors.
The issues implicated in designing an appropriate redress system for the government=s 
watch list programs can be usefully divided into two sets: first, considerations with regard to 
notice and the opportunity to challenge one=s inclusion on a watch list in the first place and 
second, the design of the actual remedial adjudication.  As with the front-end fairness charter, it 
is useful to consider redress models afforded by existing law.  These turn out to be a fruitful 
source of ideas, although, as with the front-end, existing law does not adequately describe what a 
watch list redress system should entail.  The following account thus looks at the key issues of 
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redress not only in light of existing models, but also by keeping in mind both the bureaucratic 
justice framework and the government=s national security objectives.
A. The Problem of Notice and the Privacy Act (Reprise)
The Privacy Act imposes redress requirements with regard to systems of records.  The 
key element in its approach to redress is that, with limited exceptions, the Act intends that 
individuals be made aware of the systems of records that the government maintains65 and be 
given opportunities to access and review their own records.66 Individuals specifically have the 
right to amend their records if the information is not accurate, relevant, timely, or complete.67
After reviewing his or her record, an individual is permitted to request an amendment.  No later 
than ten working days after receiving such a request, the agency must acknowledge receipt of the 
request in writing.  The agency must then promptly:  (i) make any correction of any portion of the 
record that the individual asserts Ais not accurate, relevant, timely, or complete,@ or (ii) inform the 
individual of its Arefusal to amend the record in accordance with his request, the reason for the 
refusal, the procedures established by the agency for the individual to request a review of that 
refusal by the head of the agency or an officer designated by the head of the agency, and the 
name and business address of that official.@68  Should the agency decline to amend an 
individual's record, the subject is entitled to request a review of the agency's refusal.  No later 
than thirty working days from the date the individual requests such review, the agency must 
65 5 U.S.C. ' 552a(e)(4).
66 5 U.S.C. ' 552a(d).
67 See 5 U.S.C. ' 552a(d)(1)-(2).
68 5 U.S.C. ' 552a(d)(2)(B).
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complete the review process and make a final determination.69  Upon good cause, the agency 
may extend the process beyond the thirty day period.  If, after review, the reviewing official again 
refuses to amend the record, the individual must be notified of the availability of, and the 
procedures for, judicial review.  In addition, the individual must be permitted to file with the 
agency a concise statement setting forth reasons for disagreeing with the decision.70  The 
individual's statement of disagreement must be included with any subsequent disclosure of the 
record.71  Moreover, where the agency has made prior disclosures of the record and accounted for 
such disclosures, the agency must inform the prior recipients of any correction or notation of 
dispute relating to the previously disclosed materials.72  When an agency refuses to amend an 
individual's record upon his request, the individual may also seek judicial review.73
The foundational element of this scheme B the idea that individuals may seek access to 
their own records B is an element from which watch lists may readily be exempted.   That is, the 
head of any agency that maintains an antiterrorist watch list may promulgate a rule to exempt any 
watch list record from the Privacy Act=s access and correction provisions if the record is properly 
classified74 or, within certain conditions, if it constitutes investigatory material compiled for law 
69 5 U.S.C. ' 552a(d)(3).
70 See id.
71 5 U.S.C. ' 552a(d)(4).
72 5 U.S.C. ' 552a(c)(4).
73 5 U.S.C. ' 552a(g)(1)(A).
74 The Privacy Act exemption applies to systems of records that are Asubject to the 
provisions of section 552(b)(1)@ of Title 5.  5 U.S.C. ' 552a(k)(1).  5 U.S.C. ' 552(b)(1) exempts 
records from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act if they are  AA) 
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enforcement purposes.75  In the latter case, the record is mandatorily disclosable to the subject 
individual only if the individual is Adenied any right, privilege, or benefit that he would otherwise 
be entitled by Federal law, or for which he would otherwise be eligible, as a result of the 
maintenance of such material,@ at least to the extent disclosure does not compromise the identity 
of a confidential source.76
What a bureaucratic justice perspective on watch lists suggests, however, is that either the 
blanket application to watch lists of the Privacy Act=s access regime or their blanket exemption 
should be viewed as too blunt as a matter of policy.  The rationale for some permissible 
exemption from the access requirements is obvious.  For some individuals, disclosing what the 
government knows about their potentially unlawful activities could not only stymie 
investigations in specific cases, but reveal investigative sources and methods that would impair 
government=s law enforcement effectiveness more generally.  For many of these cases, moreover, 
any public anxiety about allowing government secrecy in this domain could be rationally 
alleviated through the imposition of the front-end charter.  Many individuals presumably show up 
specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the 
interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to 
such Executive order.@
75 5 U.S.C. ' 552a(k)(2).  The agency may not exempt under this provision A(A) 
information compiled for the purpose of identifying individual criminal offenders and alleged 
offenders and consisting only of identifying data and notations of arrests, the nature and 
disposition of criminal charges, sentencing, confinement, release, and parole and probation 
status; (B) information compiled for the purpose of a criminal investigation, including reports of 
informants and investigators, and associated with an identifiable individual; or (C) reports 
identifiable to an individual compiled at any stage of the process of enforcement of the criminal 
laws from arrest or indictment through release from supervision.@  5 U.S.C. ' 552a(j)(2).
76 5 U.S.C. ' 552a(k)(2).  
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on government watch lists because of well-documented information properly linked to the 
subject individuals.  In such cases, the fairness charter would provide a reasonable guarantee (a) 
that such information was of a kind approved in writing as relevant to the agency=s watch list 
determination and (b) that it was found, through a reliable process, to have met the applicable 
standard of proof within the agency.  The presence of ongoing systematic audit procedures 
should aid substantially in maintaining quality control in such cases.
There are two kinds of cases that are more troubling, however.  One involves the prospect 
of including people on watch lists solely on the basis of Aanonymous tips.@  Agencies might 
simply determine not to do this, or to give themselves a fixed time period within which to 
investigate anonymous tips.  Under the latter system, agencies might determine to use 
anonymous tips as the basis for including individuals on watch lists only if, within the specified 
time frame, the tips could be corroborated through other investigative techniques yielding 
reliable, Asourced@ information.  Should any agency, however, reserve the right to include 
individuals on terrorists watch lists solely or primarily on account of anonymous tips that cannot 
be independently verified, then a strong argument exists for doing even more than giving the 
subject individuals access to their records upon request.  Given the absence of quality checks on 
anonymous tips and the opportunity they provide for individuals to report people to the 
government for spite or other ill motive, individuals proposed for inclusion on watch lists solely 
or primarily on the basis of unverified anonymous watch lists should be affirmatively notified of 
their inclusion.  Such individuals should get notice that the government is including them on a 
watch list because of anonymously sourced information, and they should be told the substantive 
standard that governs their inclusion.  The risk of error is otherwise too great.
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Of perhaps even broader relevance are proposals to include people on watch lists through 
an investigative method called Apattern recognition.@  Under a proposed new program called
ASecure Flight,@ the Transportation Safety Administration would not only compare passenger 
names to existing government watch lists, but it would also run names against both government-
held and commercially provided data bases to determine, based on patterns of information, 
whether individuals seeking to board aircraft were deserving of higher scrutiny as potential 
terrorists.77  Publicly available reports do not reveal just what patterns will be sought or how 
commercial data bases will be used.78  Yet, the risks of relying on such an investigative technique 
seem obvious.79
To take a purely hypothetical example, imagine that the government seeks to add to its 
77 See Berrick, supra note 50.
78 For further background information on Secure Flight, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT DIVISION, REVIEW OF THE TERRORIST 
SCREENING CENTER=S EFFORTS TO SUPPORT THE SECURE FLIGHT PROGRAM (Aug. 2005), available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0534/final.pdf; DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
SECURE FLIGHT WORKING GROUP, REPORT OF THE SECURE FLIGHT WORKING GROUP (Sept. 19, 
2005), available at http://www.schneier.com/secure-flight-report.pdf; Letter from Cathleen A. 
Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues and Linda D. Koontz, Director, 
Information Management Issues, Government Accountability Office to Government Committees, 
re: AAviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not Fully Disclose Uses of 
Personal Information during Secure Flight Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notices, but Has 
Recently Taken Steps to More Fully Inform the Public@ (July 22, 2005), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05864r.pdf.
79 Data mining of this sort has apparently been involved in the controversial program 
of warrantless electronic surveillance conducted by NSA, with what appears to a relatively 
minuscule number of Ahits@ actually worth investigating.  One newspaper quoted Jeff Jonas, chief 
scientist at IBM Entity Analytics, as contending that A[t]echniques that >look at people's behavior 
to predict terrorist intent are so far from reaching the level of accuracy that's necessary that I see 
them as nothing but civil liberty infringement engines.=@  Barton Gellman, Dafna Linzer and 
Carol D. Leonnig, ASurveillance Net Yields Few Suspects:  NSA's Hunt for Terrorists Scrutinizes 
Thousands of Americans, but Most Are Later Cleared,@ WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2006, at A1.
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list of subjects for intensified screening those individuals who (a) have traveled to the Middle 
East within the last ten years, (b) subscribe to multiple cell phones, and (c) have purchased large 
quantities of fertilizer.  One could imagine taking the view that some bomb-building terrorists 
would likely exhibit these traits and, although each is innocuous in itself, the combination is 
worth investigating.  This kind of statistical profiling, however, is undoubtedly subject to high 
rates of error.  Should an airport stop based on pattern recognition lead to the subsequent 
inclusion of the passenger=s name on a watch list, the individual might find him- or herself 
substantially burdened thereafter although no direct evidence links the individual to any 
suspicious act or behavior.  There seems a strong case that such an individual should be allowed 
some form of name-clearing procedure, on request, where the risks of unjustified burden seem so 
high.
This analysis yields a three-part answer to the question, AWhen should individuals be 
given notice and an opportunity to challenge their inclusion on a government watch list?@  If 
individuals are placed on watch lists due to well-documented information properly linked to the 
subject individuals and meeting the agency=s written standards for inclusion, then the government 
ought be required to allow for redress only if and when the individual is actually burdened by his 
or her inclusion.  Individuals should, however, have the right to inquire of the government if their 
names have been included on watch lists through the operation of some form of statistical 
profiling.  Upon request, the government should be required to inform such individuals of their 
inclusion, even if the agency does not have to reveal the nature of the underlying suspicious 
pattern.  The individual would then be entitled to challenge his or her inclusion under applicable 
procedures.  If an agency determines it is appropriate, in certain cases, to include an individual on 
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watch lists solely or primarily due to uncorroborated anonymous tips, the agency should 
affirmatively notify the subject of his or her inclusion.  In such cases, the risk of error is so great 
and the invitation to malicious third-party behavior so obvious that fairness demands an 
individual be allowed to clear his or her name.
B.  The Design of the Remedial Adjudication
Under conventional due process doctrine, the government=s adjudicatory decisions that 
potentially deprive persons of life, liberty, or property are susceptible to judicial challenge if they 
are inadequately protective of the individuals involved.  The question posed by the leading case 
of Mathews v. Eldridge is whether additional procedural protections would so likely improve the 
prospects for sound decision making as to warrant their mandatory imposition given the 
competing interests of the individual in being protected from erroneously imposed burdens and 
the interests of the government in decision making efficiency.80
Perhaps surprisingly, there may be a significant number of watch lists that do not 
technically trigger this inquiry as a constitutional mandate.  That is because the practice of listing 
individuals on terrorist watch lists is likely to implicate constitutionally protected liberty only 
some of the time.  It is legally well established that the mere inclusion of an individual=s name on 
a potentially stigmatic list, even if it puts an individual=s reputation at stake, is not deemed to 
80 AIdentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires 
identification of three distinct factors:  first, the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; 
and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.@
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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implicate a Aliberty interest@ protected by due process.81  An individual must have something at 
stake beyond his or her reputation in order to invoke the protections of due process against unfair 
listing.  The courts have thus evolved what:
has come to be known as the Astigma plus@ test for establishing deprivation of 
liberty based on governmental defamation. Under that test, a plaintiff must show 
the public disclosure of a stigmatizing statement by the government, the accuracy 
of which is contested, plus the denial of Asome more tangible interest[ ] such as 
employment,@ or the alteration of a right or status recognized by state law.82
Plaintiffs seeking to challenge on due process grounds the inadequacy of existing administrative 
procedures to correct alleged errors in watch list compilation would thus have to point to 
something Amore tangible@ than reputational harm in order to persuade a court that the Due 
Process Clause is applicable.83
Under these standards, some watch lists will trigger procedural due process requirements. 
 Most obviously, inclusion on the TSA No-Fly List results in an individual=s being barred from 
commercial air flight. When a government listing obliges airlines to deny an individual boarding 
privileges, the government=s adjudicatory decision making plainly results in a legally-mandated 
disability that extends beyond damage to reputation alone.   It is true that the one trial court so far 
81 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (holding that the plaintiff=s due process rights 
were not implicated by the erroneous inclusion of his name on a publicly circulated police poster 
of Aactive shoplifters@).
82 Ulrich v. City and County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 982 (9th Cir.2002).
83 It is unlikely that watch list cases would implicate what the Supreme Court 
considers protected property interests.  Cf., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972)  
(A>[P]roperty= denotes a broad range of interests that are secured by >existing rules or 
understandings.=  A person's interest in a benefit is a >property= interest for due process purposes if 
there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to 
the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing.@).  
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presented with this question has held that the threatened  impediment to air travel does not 
implicate a constitutionally protected liberty interest,84 but the court=s analysis seems flatly 
wrong. As compared to other cases in which a burden beyond reputational harm has been held to 
trigger due process protections, the burden of exclusion from commercial air flight is at least as 
onerous.85
There are other potential uses of watch lists either currently under consideration or easy to 
envision from existing practices that would lead to the same conclusion.  For example, it has 
been proposed that firearm purchases be forbidden to persons on terrorist watch lists.86  A legal 
bar to the lawful purchase or sale of firearms would seem plainly to extend the burden of watch 
list designation to consequences more concrete than mere stigma.  The Office of Personnel 
Management has proposed requiring organizations that seek to participate in the so-called 
84 APlaintiffs, in the present matter, argue that their status has been altered because 
they are no longer able to travel like other airline passengers because of their alleged association 
with the No-Fly List. While Plaintiffs have a right to travel throughout the United States 
>uninhibited by statutes, rules, and regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict movement,=
it is also true that >burdens on a single mode of transportation do not implicate the right to 
interstate travel.=  Thus, Plaintiffs do not have a right to travel without any impediments 
whatsoever.  Indeed, Plaintiffs do not allege that they have suffered impediments different than 
the general traveling public.@  Green v. Transportation Security Administration,  351 F.Supp.2d 
1119, 1130 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (citations omitted). 
85 The Supreme Court=s decision in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 
(1971), appears directly analogous.  Constantineau held that the posting of plaintiff as an 
habitual drunk implicated the Due Process Clause where, as a result of the posting, it became 
legally impermissible to sell him alcohol.  It seems implausible that a bar to the legal use of 
commercial air flight is so much less burdensome than a bar to the legal purchase of alcohol as to 
take the No-Fly list outside the purview of the Due Process Clause.
86 Eric Lichtblau, ATerror suspects legally buying guns, GAO finds; Being on watch 
list doesn't prohibit weapons purchases,@ SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Mar. 8, 2005, at A4, 
available at  
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/03/08/MNGSRBLUFE1.DTL.
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Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) to certify that they do not knowingly employ individuals 
associated with terrorist activities.87  If the adoption of a such a proposal disqualified listed 
individuals from employment in nonprofit organizations seeking CFC participation, that, too, 
would seem to meet the stigma-plus requirement.  Likewise, there is increasing political pressure 
to resort to criminal background checks in connection with non-government employment.  In a 
variety of contexts, state and federal laws already require that employers obtain criminal 
background information prior to hiring:
For example, many truck drivers are required to undergo pre-hire criminal 
background checks under various laws, such as the Air Transportation Security 
Act, the Safe Explosives Act, and the Maritime Transportation Security Act. In 
addition, most states require individuals in certain jobs, such as teachers, child 
care providers, and private security guards, to undergo a criminal background --
check.88
Should the inclusion of an individual on any watch list bar that person from particular 
employment under either state or federal law, a constitutional liberty interest would be 
implicated, especially if the employment implicated a line of work not available in the private 
sector.89
87 Memorandum from Mara T. Patermaster, Director, Office of CFC Operations to 
Local Federal Coordinating Committees, Principal Combined Fund Organizations, National and 
Local Federations and National and Local Unaffiliated Organizations, re:  2005 CFC Application 
- Guidance on Compliance with the Anti-terrorism Certification (CFC Memorandum 2004-12,  
November 24, 2004), available at http://www.opm.gov/cfc/opmmemos/2004/2004-12.asp.  It 
appears, however, that OPM is backing off from its proposal. Stephanie Strom, ARequirement on 
Watch Lists is Dropped,@ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2005, at __.
88 AUsing FBI Databases for Hiring Purposes Raises Many Issues, Commenters Tell 
DOJ,@ U.S. LAW WEEK, Oct. 11, 2005, at 2198, available at 
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/law2.nsf/is/a0b1p5k8j1.
89 Cf., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (implying that the termination 
without hearing of the security clearance of an aeronautical engineer might raise constitutional 
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As a matter of policy, however, these threshold constitutional questions seem largely 
irrelevant.  That is because, as a matter of policy, it would seem foolish ever to ignore the 
wisdom of Mathews v. Eldridge.  If, against the background of competing individual and agency 
interests, additional procedural protections would so likely improve the prospects for sound 
decision making as to justify the cost of their imposition, it would be perverse to ignore them.  
For this reason, due process law seems to provide the right policy framework for thinking about 
redress adjudications in the watch list context, whether or not Mathews v. Eldridge technically 
applies.
Because that framework looks to the incremental value of additional procedures, it is 
instructive to examine first the informal redress processes that two agencies have already 
developed with regard to their watch list processes.  A person who has been stopped at the airport 
due to watch listing may file a Passenger Identification Verification Form with the 
Transportation Security Agency.90  The form requires the passenger to submit a substantial 
variety of information designed to enable the TSA to determine whether the particular individual 
is or is not the individual whose name is supposed to trigger a watch list response.  With regard 
to a person TSA did not intended to target, but who happens to share a name with someone 
properly listed, this process may actually comply with due process. Affected individuals are 
notified of the potentially adverse government action, given a reason for that action (AYour name 
concerns because an aeronautical engineer unable to get a security clearance would be severely 
limited in his or her work opportunities).
90 Some such program is required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, ' 4012(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3714, codified at 49 
U.S.C. ' 44903(j)(2)(iii)(i).
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is on our watch list@), and afforded an opportunity to demonstrate that they are not the person that 
the TSA actually wanted to target.  Whether this process fully meets the standards of Mathews v. 
Eldridge is difficult to determine, however, without deeper understanding of the way in which 
the TSA=s internal investigatory system works.  What is clear is that the system categorically fails 
to address those cases in which a person is accurately identified by the TSA, but believes he or 
she has been targeted without justification.  That is, an individual like the diplomat John Graham, 
whose case is mentioned above,91 does not have opportunities through the TSA process to learn 
why he is on the list and to challenge the TSA=s conclusions.
By way of comparison, the Department of Homeland Security has seemingly adopted a 
somewhat more protective process for the so-called US-VISIT (United States Visitor and 
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology) program.92  US-VISIT collects biometric information 
such as digital, inkless fingerscans and digital photographs in order to verify that persons seeking 
entry into the United States are actually the same persons to whom visas have been granted, and 
to check the individual against other criminal and terrorist watch lists.  Persons who believe their 
data are in error may so inform U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers, who may make 
corrections on the spot.  Likewise, anyone processed through the program may seek to have their 
records reviewed Afor accuracy, relevancy, timeliness, or completeness@ by the US-VISIT Privacy 
Officer.  If a dispute is not resolved to the individual=s satisfaction, the aggrieved party may lodge 
an administrative appeal with DHS=s Chief Privacy Officer, who is to Aprovide final adjudication 
91 See note 2, supra.
92 Department of Homeland Security, US_VISIT Redress Policy, available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0436.xml.
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of the matter.@93  What is intriguing about this seemingly more elaborate process is that DHS has 
voluntarily adopted it although B because US-VISIT applies to non-citizens who are not 
permanent residents of the United States B there was neither a constitutional nor statutory 
mandate to provide any process at all.  If providing a multilevel redress system is consistent with 
the government=s interests in effective decision making in this context, it would seem difficult to 
argue that redress of similar stringency would be inconsistent with government interests in any 
other watch list, even if governed by Mathews v. Eldridge.
In thinking through the process design issue, it is going to be necessary to distinguish 
between the two major causes of potential error: mistaken identity and listing without adequate 
justification.  The former is undoubtedly easier to determine and can presumably be tested in 
most cases without exposing any sensitive information that the government possesses.  The latter 
may be rougher to resolve on both grounds.  Further, from the individual=s point of view, the 
optimal level of procedural elaborateness is likely to vary with the burden triggered by being 
listed.  It is one thing to have to show up for commercial air flights 15 minutes earlier, another to 
be barred from lines of employment.
The most thoughtful current attempt to propose watch list redress that goes beyond the 
current TSA model appears in a paper by Paul Rosenzweig and Jeff Jonas for the Heritage 
Foundation.94  The RJ system, as I shall call it, would address only the Afalse positive@ problem, 
i.e., when the subject=s name is on the list, but the subject is not the person intended to be 
93 Id.
94 Paul Rosenzweig and Jeff Jonas, Correcting False Positives: Redress and the 
Watch List Conundrum (Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum No. 17, June 17, 2005).
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targeted.  The redress structure offered would be automatically triggered by adverse action, but 
could potentially be initiated also through citizen-initiated inquiries.  Subjects would have a 
designated entry point for complaint and the guarantee of an independent decisionmaker (e.g., an 
ombudsperson) to review the dispute.  They would receive a reason for any adverse consequence 
imposed, although the transparency of underlying evidence could vary with the seriousness of the 
burden imposed and the sensitivity of that information in terms of national security.  For cases 
initiated through the imposition of a burden, some informal opportunity for redress would exist 
immediately on site.  Should that process prove unsatisfactory, informal higher level 
administrative review based on a written presentation would be possible, subject to a specified 
time limit for agency response.  RJ would give any subject still aggrieved access to an appeal 
before an administrative hearing officer, before whom the subject could appear in person and 
with legal representation.  The hearing officer could review all relevant records at least in
camera.  Should the subject still not prevail, he or she could pursue judicial relief under a de 
novo standard of review.  The government would bear the burden of proof in any such action.  
Should any subject establish a mistake in identity, he or she would be entitled to have his or her 
status certified in a separate database, which would be accessible to all end users of the original 
watch list.  As with the Privacy Act, gross negligence or intentional misconduct in creating or 
maintaining watch list records could be redressed through civil fines.
Thoughtful as this system is, it is easy to imagine significant resistance to its 
elaborateness by those government agencies engaged in watch list maintenance.  It seems to 
focus very substantial resources on cases that, if the system is properly managed, may not require 
so many layers or so much intensity of post-listing scrutiny.  On the other hand, there is ample 
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reason B as a matter of policy B to think that the minimal due process and Privacy Act models do 
not go far enough.  As noted above, DHS affords a system of review for the US-VISIT list that 
allows non-citizens two levels of administrative challenge based on written presentations.  In a 
context of comparable sensitivity, Department of Defense employees confronting an adverse 
determination with regard to their security clearance are also entitled to a significant degree of 
protection.  Among the key provisions are these:
1. A written statement of the reasons why the unfavorable administrative action is 
being taken, which Ashall be as comprehensive and detailed as the protection of 
sources afforded confidentiality under the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 
U.S.C. 552a) and national security permit@;95
2. A right to a copy of the investigative file(s) upon which the unfavorable 
administrative action is being taken;96
3. An opportunity to reply in writing to such authority as the head of the Component 
concerned may designate;97
4. A written response to any challenge, stating the final reasons for the agency 
action, which shall be as specific as privacy and national security considerations 
permit;98
5. Time limits for such response;99 and
6. An opportunity to appeal to a higher level of authority designated by the 
Component concerned.100
95 32 C.F. R. ' 154.56(b)(1).
96 Id.
97 32 C.F. R. ' 154.56(b)(2).
98 32 C.F. R. ' 154.56(b)(3).
99 Id.
100 32 C.F. R. ' 154.56(b)(4.).
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This system, also designed in a sensitive national security context, includes detailed notice, an 
opportunity to review contrary evidence, and two levels of appellate administrative judgment. 
This organizational precedent, like the US-VISIT program, strongly suggests that the government 
would not be overburdened by a multiple-level review process, at least if limited to appropriate 
cases.  The DOD regulations also suggest that some degree of transparency to facilitate effective 
challenges is not unthinkable even in a national security context.  (A comparison of the models 
discussed appears below.) 
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Minimal Due 
Process
Privacy Act Rosenzweig/
Jonas system
Adverse security 
determination
Citizen-initiated inquiries U Might be limited by time, to citizens, or to in-
person inquiry
Redress initiated by adverse 
action
If liberty interests 
affected
U
Designated entry point for 
complaint U U
Independent decisionmaker 
(e.g., ombudsperson) U
Statement of reason for adverse 
consequence U U In writing
Transparency of underlying 
evidence Depends on weight of burden and information at 
issue
U
On-site informal redress U U
Informal higher level 
administrative review based on 
written presentation
U U U U
Time-limit for response U U U
Administrative hearing officer 
appeal U
Other higher level appeal
Right to be heard U
Right to representation U
Right to review of records by 
ALJ in camera U
Judicial review under de novo 
standard Standard of review 
not determined
U U
Government bears burden of 
proof U
Certification of exoneration U
Dispersion of corrections to all 
end users U
Persistence of information in 
dispute
U
Damages remedies for grossly 
misconduct U U
TABLE 2.  COMPARISON OF SELECTED CURRENT REDRESS MODELS
The proposed RJ system, however, would go significantly beyond any current redress 
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system in terms of procedural elaborateness.  Given the likely stakes and competing interests in 
watch list redress cases, the most sensible Mathews-type approach would be for the government 
to develop two sets of administrative procedures, one formal and one informal.  Only the formal 
system would involve an oral administrative hearing and judicial review under a de novo 
evidentiary standard and with the government bearing the burden of proof. Should the 
government decline to implement the front-end fairness protections already discussed B clear 
written standards regarding criteria for inclusion, relevant evidence, and standards of proof; a 
rigorous and reliable nominating process; rigorous programs of internal monitoring and error 
correction; and a system architecture to assure that accuracy and completeness of records B then 
the formal procedure should be applicable in every case when an individual challenges his or her 
inclusion on a watch list for any reason.  If the government were to implement such a front-end 
program, however, the informal process should suffice for all mistaken identity cases in which an 
adjudicator determines that the front-end standards and processes were observed.  The formal 
process should be reserved for cases of allegedly insufficient justification for inclusion and only 
those mistaken identity cases in which the relevant agencies failed to observe the applicable 
front-end requirements. 
The table on the next page compares the features of the two recommended systems, 
formal and informal.  The formal procedure recommended is essentially the RJ system, with the 
specification that, in cases of allegedly inadequate justification, the individual affected should be 
entitled to appear in person before an administrative law judge and make his or her case with the 
benefit of legal representation.  If this is allowed in cases of adverse security clearance
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Informal Dispute Resolution Formal Dispute Resolution
Redress initiated by adverse action U U
Designated entry point for complaint U U
Independent decisionmaker (e.g., 
ombudsperson) U U
Statement of reason for adverse 
consequence U U
Transparency of underlying evidence Notice would indicate the 
standard under which 
individual was included on the 
watch list, but not evidence
Depends on weight of burden and 
information at issue B agencies should 
have designated public representatives 
with security clearances to review 
records
On-site informal redress U
Informal higher level administrative 
review based on written presentation U U
Time-limit for response U U
Written appeal to higher level 
administrative officer U
Appeal in person to administrative 
law judge U
Right to be heard U
Right to representation U
Right to review of records by ALJ in 
camera
U
Judicial review under arbitrary and 
capricious standard U
Judicial review under de novo 
standard U
Government bears burden of proof U
Certification of exoneration U U
Dispersion of corrections to all end 
users
U U
Persistence of information in dispute U U
Damages remedies for grossly 
misconduct U U
TABLE 3.  COMPARISON OF RECOMMENDED REDRESS PROCEDURES
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determinations, then following the same process for disputed watch list inclusion would not seem 
to impose insuperable burdens on the government.  If the agency is concerned about exposing 
confidential records to private counsel, it should employ government attorneys to serve as public 
advocates, who will have security clearance at a level adequate to insure that they can review 
classified material.
In comparison, with the front-end fairness program in place, it would seem sufficient to 
confine the redress process for alleged cases of mistaken identity to written procedures.  If a case 
cannot be resolved on the spot, then the focus of administrative review in the agency should be 
two-fold: First, is the evidence provided by the individual persuasive as to his or her actual 
identity?  Second, if there is doubt, then did the agency follow the relevant written standards in 
terms of including the individual on the list, the kinds of evidence relied upon, the standard of 
proof applied, and the required procedural rigor of the nomination process?  If the answer to 
these questions is affirmative, then the agency should not be required to remove the petitioner 
from its watch list.  Moreover, should the petitioner challenge the agency=s decision making in 
court, it should be reviewed only for arbitrariness, not under a de novo standard. On the other 
hand, if the answer to any of these questions is negative, then the petitioner should have the right 
to resort to the more formal redress process.  The informal process should not be any more 
burdensome on the government than the redress process already adopted voluntarily for the US-
VISIT program.
Under either process, the government should provide a means for preserving in the 
system and circulating to end users the fact that an individual has challenged his or her inclusion 
and the evidence proffered for the challenge.  That information may suffice, if not to exonerate 
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the individual, then at least to qualify the complainant for less onerous treatment or to keep 
relevant agencies on alert for the possible utility of further investigation.
IV. Conclusion
It is difficult to overstate how much is at stake both for the government and for individual 
citizens in avoiding inaccuracy in the maintenance of watch lists that are tools for law 
enforcement and national security.  Inadequate protection against inaccuracy B including 
appropriate redress for persons who believe that they have been included on one or more lists due 
to mistaken identity or with inadequate justification B runs the risk of delegitimating the 
government=s watch list programs in the eyes of the American people.
It would be a mistake, however, to think about the appropriate level of bureaucratic 
fairness protection solely in terms of individual redress.  Such a focus would do no good for any 
person erroneously listed, but without their knowledge.  Moreover, a fairness system devoted 
entirely to post-incident redress would arguably devote significant resources to formal 
administrative adjudication that would produce more accuracy for more people if devoted to a 
front-end process designed to assure watch list accuracy.
Because no potentially applicable legal regime B neither the Privacy Act, nor the Supreme 
Court=s Fifth Amendment due process cases B provides adequate guidance in the watch list 
context, Congress should adopt a legislative regime that takes a bureaucratic justice approach to 
achieving fairness in the administration of government watch lists.  Such an approach would 
combine the set of front-end fairness charter provisions enumerated earlier with a nuanced 
approach to the question of notice, and a redress system that operates on two tracks.  The formal 
track, necessary when an individual challenges the justification for his or her inclusion, but not 
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the government=s conclusion as to his or her identity, should offer a relatively elaborate version 
of administrative due process, akin to the procedures applicable when Defense Department 
employees find their security credentials challenged.  The informal track should suffice in cases 
of alleged mistaken identity, as long as the government promulgates and implements clear 
written standards regarding criteria for inclusion, relevant evidence, and standards of proof; a 
rigorous and reliable nominating process; rigorous programs of internal monitoring and error 
correction; and a system architecture to assure the accuracy and completeness of records.
Antiterrorist watch lists represent a rational, if not yet fully proven tool for protecting 
Americans from threats to their national security.  Government mindfulness of the obligation to 
do justice in the use of this tool will not only make the tool better, but assure its continued 
legitimacy in the eyes of the American people and their elected representatives.
